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Randomness is a useful computation resource due to its ability to
enhance the capabilities of other resources. Its interaction with resources
such as time, space, interaction with provers and its role in several areas
of computer science has been extensively studied. In this paper we give
a systematic analysis of the amount of randomness needed by secret
sharing schemes and secure key distribution schemes. We give both
upper and lower bounds on the number of random bits needed by secret
sharing schemes. The bounds are tight for several classes of secret sharing
schemes. For secure key distribution schemes we provide a lower bound
on the amount of randomness needed, thus showing the optimality of a
recently proposed key distribution protocol. ] 1996 Academic Press
1. INTRODUCTION
Randomness plays an important role in several areas of computer science, most
notably algorithm design, complexity, and cryptography. Since random bits are a
natural computational resource, the amount of randomness used in a computation
is an important issue in many applications. Therefore, considerable effort has been
devoted both to reducing the number of random bits used by probabilistic algo-
rithms (see for instance [25]) and to analyzing the amount of randomness required
in order to achieve a given performance [29]. Motivated by the fact that ‘‘truly’’
random bits are hard to obtain, it has also been recently investigated the possibility
of using imperfect sources of randomness in randomized algorithms [40]. However,
in spite of the considerable effort devoted to understanding the effect of randomness
in several areas of computer science, very few rigourous results have been obtained
to quantify the number of random bits needed to solve classes of problems. This is
the object of the present paper.
In this paper we give a systematic analysis of the randomness in distribution
protocols of practical importance in data security. More precisely, we will quantify
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the amount of randomness required in secret sharing schemes and in secure key dis-
tribution schemes. Secret sharing schemes are useful in any important action that
requires the concurrence of several designated people to be initiated, such as
launching a missile, opening a bank vault, or even opening a safety deposit box.
Secret sharing schemes are also used in the management of cryptographic keys and
multi-party secure protocols (see [22, 4]). We refer the reader to the excellent sur-
vey papers [36, 37] for a detailed discussion of secret sharing schemes and for a
complete bibliography on the argument. Key distribution is a central problem in
cryptographic systems, and is a major component of the security subsystem of dis-
tributed systems, communication systems, and data networks. A growing applica-
tion area in networking is ‘‘conferencing’’ where a group of entities (or network
locations) collaborate privately in an interactive procedure (such as a board meet-
ing, a scientific discussion, a task-force, a classroom, or an interactive engineering
design group); see for example [6, 9, 23, 30].
Since different algorithms might use random bits produced by different sources,
we first need a uniform measure for the amount of randomness provided by dif-
ferent sources. To this aim, we use the Shannon entropy of the source generating
the random bits, since it represents the most general and natural measure of ran-
domness. We recall the important result of Knuth and Yao [28] that shows that
the Shannon entropy of a random variable (i.e., of a memoryless random source)
is closely related to a more algorithmically oriented measure of randomness; more
precisely, Knuth and Yao have shown that the entropy of a random variable X is
approximatively equal to the average number of tosses of an unbiased coin
necessary to simulate the outcomes of X. For this and other interesting relations of
the Shannon entropy to another measure of complexity, like Kolmogorov com-
plexity, we advise the reader to consult the very readable account given in [19].
We give now a brief outline of the results in this paper. In Section 2 we analyze
the amount of randomness in secret sharing schemes, measured by the entropy of
the probability space from which the shares to be given to the participants are
taken. Given an access structure, that is, the collection of subsets of participants
qualified to reconstruct the secret, we give a lower bound to the entropy necessary
to generate the shares that holds for any secret sharing scheme for the given access
structure; the lower bound is expressed in terms of a combinatorial parameter that
depends only upon the access structure and not on the particular secret sharing
scheme used. In particular, the lower bound coincides with the constructive upper
bound for several important classes of secret sharing schemes, most notably (n, k)
threshold schemes [5, 35], and access structures based on trees [10]. Therefore, the
schemes for these classes of secret sharing are optimal with respect the number of
random bits used. In Section 3 we analyze the amount of randomness in secure key
distribution schemes; we give a lower bound on it and we show that the protocol
presented in [9] is optimal with respect to the amount of randomness needed.
2. DEALER’S RANDOMNESS IN SECRET SHARING SCHEMES
In this section we define and analyze the measure for the amount of randomness
in a secret sharing scheme.
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To motivate our approach let us consider Shamir’s classical scheme [35] for
sharing a secret s, uniformly chosen in GF(2r),1 among n<2r participants in such
a way that only coalitions of k (or more) participants can reconstruct s, whereas
any group of fewer than k participants cannot determine anything about s (such
schemes are known in the literature under the name of (n, k) threshold schemes).
To set up an (n, k) threshold scheme, the dealer in Shamir’s scheme independently
and uniformly chooses k&1 elements a1 , a2 , ..., ak&1 in GF(2r) and then constructs
the polynomial f ( y)=s+a1 y+a2 y2+ } } } +ak&1 yk&1. The share distributed to
the i th participant is equal to f (i). It is easy to see that if at least k participants join
together they can reconstruct f ( y) by polynomial interpolation, and therefore the
secret s= f (0), whereas any group of fewer than k participants has absolutely no
information on s.
The total number of random bits in the scheme is equal to kr. The choice of the
secret s requires r bits, while the remaining r(k&1) bits are used by the dealer to
set up the scheme, that is, to choose the coefficients a1 , ..., ak&1 # GF(2r). Thus,
given the secret, the dealer in Shamir’s scheme uses (k&1) r bits of randomness. In
the next sections, as consequence of much more general results, we will prove that
Shamir’s scheme is indeed optimal in this respect.
In terms of entropy, Shamir’s scheme requires that the probability space from
which the shares are taken have an entropy k&1 times the entropy of the proba-
bility space of the secret. Hence, also in view of Theorem 2.1, it is natural to define
the dealer’s randomness in terms of the entropy of the probability space from which
the shares are taken.
The dealer’s randomness is formally defined using the Shannon entropy of the
random variables generating the secret and the shares. Given a probability distribu-
tion P=( p1 , ..., pn), the Shannon entropy of P is H(P)= &ni=1 pi log pi . The
entropy is strictly related to the measure of randomness introduced by Knuth and
Yao [28]. Let A be an algorithm that generates the probability distribution
P=( p1 , ..., pn) using only independent and unbiased random bits in inputs. Denote
by T(A) the average number of random bits used by the algorithm A and let
T(P)=minA T(A).
Theorem 2.1 [28].
H(P)T(P)<H(P)+2.
Thus, the entropy of a random source is very close to the average number of
independent unbiased random bits necessary to simulate the source.
2.1. Secret Sharing Schemes
A secret sharing scheme permits a secret to be shared among a set P of n
participants in such a way that only qualified subsets of P can recover the secret,
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but any nonqualified subset has absolutely no information on the secret. An access
structure A is the set of all subsets of P that can recover the secret.
Definition 2.2. Let P be a set of participants. A monotone access structure A
on P is a subset A2P "[<], such that
A # A, AA$P O A$ # A.
Definition 2.3. Let P be a set of participants and let A2P. The closure of
A, denoted by cl(A), is the set
cl(A)=[C | B # A and BCP].
For a monotone access structure A we have A=cl(A). All access structures
considered in this paper are monotone.
Let A be an access structure. A set C # A is a minimal set of A if it does not
contain any set in A"[C]. A basis A0 of A is the family of all minimal sets of A.
We will refer to a participant P # P as an essential participant if there exists a set
XP such that X _ [P] # A0 . If a participant P is not essential then we can con-
struct a secret sharing scheme giving him nothing as share. In this paper we assume
that the set of participants P consists only of essential participants.
To avoid overburdening the notation, with the same symbol X we will denote
both the set X and the random variable taking values in X according to some prob-
ability distribution [ pX (x)]x # X , the difference will always be clear from the con-
text. Let S be the set of secrets, [ pS (s)]s # S be a probability distribution on S, and
let a secret sharing scheme 7 for secrets in S be fixed. For any participant P # P,
let us denote by K(P) the set of all possible shares given to participant P. Suppose
a dealer D wants to a share the secret s # S among the participants in P (we will
assume that D  P). He does this by giving each participant P # P a share from
K(P) chosen according to some, not necessarily uniform, probability distribution.
Given a set of participants A=[Pi1 , ..., Pir]P, denote by K(A)=K(Pi1)_ } } }
_K(Pir).
We represent a secret sharing scheme 7 by a pair (F, [6s]s # S), where F is a
collection of distribution rules and [6s]s # S is a family of probability distributions.2
A distribution rule is a function f : P _ [D]  P # P K(P) _ S which satisfies the
conditions that f (D) # S and f (Pi) # K(Pi), for i=1, 2, ..., n. A distribution rule f
represents a possible distribution of shares to the participants, where f (D) is the
secret being shared, and f (Pi) is the share given to Pi . If F is a family of distribu-
tion rules and s # S, then Fs=[ f # F: f (D)=s] is the family of all distribution
rules having s as the secret. If s # S is the value of the secret that D wants to share,
then D will randomly choose a distribution rule f # Fs , according to the probability
distribution 6s , and use f to distribute shares to the participants.
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The family of distribution rules F can also be depicted as a matrix M, each row
of which corresponds to one distribution rule. One column of M will be indexed
by D, and the remaining columns are indexed by the members of P.
Any secret sharing scheme for secrets in S and a probability distribution
[ pS (s)]s # S naturally induce a probability distribution on K(A), for any AP.
Denote such a probability distribution by [ pK(A)(a)]a # K(A) . Finally, denote by
H(S) the entropy of [ pS (s)]s # S and by H(A) the entropy of [ pK(A)(a)]a # K(A) , for
any AP.
In terms of the probability distribution on the secret and on the shares given to
participants, we say that a secret sharing scheme is a perfect secret sharing scheme
with secrets chosen in S, or simply a secret sharing scheme with secrets chosen in
S, for the monotone access structure A2P if
1. Any subset AP of participants qualified to recover the secret can com-
pute the secret:
If A # A, then for all a # K(A) with pK(A)(a)>0 there exists a unique
secret s # S such that p(s | a)=1.
2. Any subset AP of participants unqualified to recover the secret has no
information on the secret value:
If A  A, then for all s # S and for all a # A, it holds that p(s | a)=pS (s).
Property 1 means that the value of the shares held by A # A completely determines
the secret s # S. Notice that Property 2 means that the probability that the secret is
equal to s given that the shares held by A  A are a, is the same as the a priori
probability of the secret s. Therefore, no amount of knowledge of shares of par-
ticipants unqualified to reconstruct the secret enables a Bayesian opponent to
modify an a priori guess regarding what the secret is.
Following the approach of [26, 17] we can restate the above Properties 1 and
2 using the Shannon’s entropy and the conditional entropy (for the information-
theoretic background we refer the reader to [19]).
Therefore, we say that a secret sharing scheme is a sharing of the secrets in S
among participants in P such that
1$. Any subset AP of participants qualified to recover the secret can com-
pute the secret:
Formally, for all A # A, it holds that H(S | A)=0.
2$. Any subset AP of participants unqualified to recover the secret has no
information on the secret value:
Formally, for all A  A, it holds that H(S | A)=H(S).
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Notice that H(S | A)=0 means that each set of values of the shares in A
corresponds to a unique value of the secret. In fact, by definition, H(S | A)=0 is
equivalent to the fact that for all a # K(A) with pK(A)(a)>0 a unique s # S exists
such that p(s | a)=1. Moreover, H(S | A)=H(S) is equivalent to stating that S and
K(A) are statistically independent; i.e., for all a # K(A) and for all s # S, it holds that
p(s | a)=pS (s) and therefore the knowledge of a gives no information about the
secret.
The following lemmas were proved by Capocelli, De Santis, Gargano, and Vaccaro
[17]. Since their proofs are simple, we report them for the reader’s convenience.
Lemma 2.4. Let A be an access structure on a set P of participants and
X, Y # 2P. Let Y  A and X _ Y # A. Then H(X | Y)=H(S)+H(X | YS).
Proof. The conditional mutual information I(X; S | Y) can be written either as
H(X | Y)&H(X | YS) or as H(S | Y)&H(S | XY) (see formula (8) of Appendix A).
Hence, H(X | Y)=H(X | YS)+H(S | Y)&H(S | XY). Because of H(S | XY)=0 for
X _ Y # A and H(S | Y)=H(S) for Y  A, we have H(X | Y)=H(S)+H(X | YS). K
An immediate consequence of Lemma 2.4 is that for any P # P it holds that
H(P)H(S).
Lemma 2.5. Let A be an access structure on a set P of participants and
X, Y/P. If X _ Y  A then H(Y | X)=H(Y | XS).
Proof. The conditional mutual information I(Y; S | X) can be written either as
H(Y | X)&H(Y | XS) or as H(S | X)&H(S | XY). Hence, H(Y | X)=H(Y | XS)+
H(S | X)&H(S | XY). Because of H(S | XY)=H(S | X)=H(S), for X _ Y  A, we
have H(Y | X)=H(Y | XS). K
Throughout this paper we assume that all of the secrets are chosen with nonzero
probability. The following theorem was proved in [12].
Theorem 2.6. Let A be an access structure on a set of participants P. If there
exists a set X/P with X  A such that for any secret sharing scheme for A with
secrets chosen in S it holds that H(X),(H(S)), for some nondecreasing function ,,
then the entropy H(X) satisfies
H(X),(log |S| ).
2.2. Dealer's Randomness
In this section we analyze the randomness needed to realize a secret sharing
scheme for a given access structure A. The total randomness present in a secret
sharing scheme for an access structure A on a set P=[P1 , ..., Pn] of n participants
is equal to the entropy H(P1 } } } Pn). This takes into account also the randomness
H(S) of the secret. The dealer’s randomness is the randomness needed by the dealer
to set up a secret sharing scheme for secrets in S, that is, the randomness it uses
to generate the shares, given that the set S and the probability distribution
[ pS (s)]s # S are known. Therefore, for an access structure A and a secret sharing
scheme the amount of randomness used by the dealer is equal to the entropy
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H(P1 } } } Pn | S). This randomness is needed only to generate the shares distributed
to participants. The total randomness and the dealer’s randomness are related by
the following lemma.
Lemma 2.7. Let A be an access structure on a set P of participants. For any
secret sharing scheme for secrets in S, it holds that
H(P1 } } } Pn)=H(P1 } } } Pn | S)+H(S).
Proof. The mutual information I(P1 } } } Pn ; S) can be written either as
H(P1 } } } Pn)&H(P1 } } } Pn | S) or as H(S)&H(S | P1 } } } Pn) (see formula (5) of
Appendix A). Hence, H(P1 } } } Pn)=H(P1 } } } Pn | S)+H(S)&H(S | P1 } } } Pn). Since
A{< it follows that [P1 , ..., Pn] # A and thus H(S | P1 } } } Pn)=0. Hence,
H(P1 } } } Pn)=H(P1 } } } Pn | S)+H(S). K
To analyze the randomness needed by the dealer we define the dealer's random-
ness of a secret sharing scheme 7, when the probability distribution on the set of
secrets S is 6S , as
+(A, 6S , 7)=H(P1 } } } Pn | S).
The value +(A, 6S , 7) represents the amount of randomness required by the dealer
to set up the scheme when using the scheme 7 and when 6S is the probability
distribution on the secret. Notice that +(A, 6S , 7) also depends on 7 since the
probability that participants receive given shares, and therefore the entropy
H(P1 } } } Pn | S), depends both on [ pS (s)]s # S and on the distribution scheme 7.
Since we are interested in the minimum amount of randomness possible for a given
access structure A, we give the following definition.
Definition 2.8. Let A be an access structure on a set P=[P1 , ..., Pn] of
participants. The dealer's randomness +(A, q) of A is defined as
+(A, q)= inf
Q, T
+(A, 6S , 7)
where Q is the space of all probability distributions 6S on a set S of q secrets and
T is the space of all secret sharing schemes 7 for the access structure A.
We recall that throughout this paper we assume that all of the secrets are chosen
with nonzero probability.
Remark 2.9. Since in this paper we are interested in providing lower bounds on
the number of random bits used in distribution protocols, we could also have
defined the dealer’s randomness as
+$(A, q)= min
T, s # S
H(P1P2 } } } Pn | S=s),
where T is the space of all secret sharing schemes 7 for the access structure A
with secret chosen in a set S of cardinality q. Nevertheless, the two definitions are
117RANDOMNESS IN DISTRIBUTION PROTOCOLS
File: 643J 261008 . By:CV . Date:14:01:97 . Time:08:21 LOP8M. V8.0. Page 01:01
Codes: 3010 Signs: 1693 . Length: 52 pic 10 pts, 222 mm
equivalent (i.e., +(A, q)=+$(A, q)). Indeed, it is clear that +(A, q)+$(A, q). To
prove the opposite inequality, let 6S, = be a probability distribution such that
Pr(S{s )== and Pr(S=s )=1&s{s Pr(S=s), where s is the secret for which the
value of +$(A, q) is achieved. It is obvious that +(A, q)lim=  0 +(A, 6S, = , 7)=
+$(A, q).
2.3. Lower Bound
In this section we present a lower bound on the dealer’s randomness +(A, q)
of any distribution protocol realizing a secret sharing scheme for a given access
structure A.
Definition 2.10. Let A be an access structure on a set P=[P1 , ..., Pn] of par-
ticipants. A sequence Pj1 } } } Pjm of participants is called independent if
1. [Pj1 , ..., Pjm]  A.
2. for all i<m a subset Xi # 2P of participants exists such that
(a) [Pj1 , ..., Pji] _ Xi  A,
(b) [Pj1 , ..., Pji , Pji+1] _ Xi # A.
Note that the fact that :; is an independent sequence does not imply that ;: is
an independent sequence. For example, consider the access structure on the set of
participants P=[A, B, C, D] defined as the closure of [[A, B], [B, C], [C, D]].
Then AC is an independent sequence but CA is not.
Theorem 2.11. Let A be an access structure on a set P=[P1 , ..., Pn] of par-
ticipants. Supposing the secret is chosen in S, if there exists an independent sequence
of length m then
+(A, |S| )m log |S|.
Proof. Let Pi1 , ..., Pim be an independent sequence of participants. We have
H(Pi1 } } } Pim)=H(Pi1)+H(Pi2 | Pi1)+ } } } +H(Pim | Pi1 } } } Pim&1)
(from (4) of Appendix A)
H(Pi1)+H(Pi2 | Pi1 X1)+ } } } +H(Pim | Pi1 } } } Pim&1 Xm&1)
(from (9) of Appendix A)
mH(S) (from Lemma 2.4).
Therefore, H(Pi1 } } } Pim)mH(S). Since, [Pi1 , ..., Pim]  A, from Theorem 2.6 we
get H(Pi1 } } } Pim)m log |S|. From Eqs. (4) and (3) of Appendix A we get
H(P1P2 } } } Pn | S)H(Pi1 } } } Pim | S).
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Since [Pi1 , ..., Pim]  A, from Lemma 2.5 we have H(Pi1 } } } Pim)=H(Pi1 } } } Pim | S)
and thus
H(P1P2 } } } Pn | S)H(Pi1 } } } Pim | S)
=H(Pi1 } } } Pim)
m log |S|.
Hence, for any secret sharing scheme it holds that
H(P1P2 } } } Pn | S)m log |S|,
and the theorem follows. K
The next corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.11.
Corollary 2.12. Let A be an access structure and let A0 be a basis of A.
Suppose the secrets are chosen in S; then the dealer's randomness satisfies
+(A, |S| ) max
X # A0
( |X|&1) log |S|.
Proof. Let X=[Pj1 , Pj2 , ..., Pjl] be a qualified set, X # A0 . The sequence of par-
ticipants Pj1 Pj2 } } } Pjl&1 is an independent sequence. In fact, [Pj1 , Pj2 , ..., Pjl&1]  A
and for any i<l&1 the set Xi=[Pji+2 , ..., Pjl] satisfies Property 2 of Defini-
tion 2.10. Thus, from Theorem 2.11 we have +(A)(|X|&1) log |S| and the
corollary holds. K
We denote as US the uniform probability distribution on the set of secrets S. The
next theorem proves that the dealer’s randomness of an (n, k) threshold scheme is
k&1 times the size of the secret, and therefore implies that Shamir scheme [35] is
optimal with respect to the number of random bits used.
Theorem 2.13. Let A be the access structure of an (n, k) threshold scheme. If the
number of secrets is |S|=2r>n, for some positive integer r, then there exists a secret
sharing scheme 7, optimal with respect to the number of random bits used, in which
the dealer's randomness is equal to +(A, US , 7)=(k&1) log |S|.
Proof. From Corollary 2.12 we have +(A, |S| )(k&1) log |S|. Therefore,
+(A, US , 7)(k&1) log |S| for any scheme 7. It is easy to see that the scheme
proposed by Shamir [35] has H(P1 } } } Pn | S)=(k&1) log |S| (see also the discus-
sion at the beginning of Section 2). Hence, Shamir’s scheme is optimal with respect
to the number of random bits used and the theorem holds. K
We now analyze the dealer’s randomness for graph based access structures, that
is, access structures for which the set of participants can be identified with the
vertex set V(G) of a graph G=(V(G), E(G)), and the set of participants qualified
to reconstruct the secret are only those containing an edge of G. Equivalently, these
are access structures that coincides with the closure of E(G), for some graph
G=(V(G), E(G)). Secret sharing schemes for such access structures have been
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extensively studied in [8, 10, 1517, 38]. For an access structure A which consists
of the closure of the edge-set of a graph G we denote the dealer’s randomness by
+(G, |S| )=+(A, |S| ). The next theorem proves a ‘‘gap’’ on the values that +(G, |S| )
can take, that is, the dealer’s randomness is either log |S| or 2 log |S| , depending
on whether the graph is complete multipartite. (Recall that the complete multipartite
graph Kn1 , n2 , ..., nt is a graph on 
t
i=1 ni vertices, in which the vertex set is partitioned
into subsets of size ni , i=1, ..., t, called parts, such that xy is an edge if and only
if x and y are in different parts.) Moreover, we completely characterize the graphs
that have dealer’s randomness equal to log |S|.
Theorem 2.14 (Gap Theorem). Let G be a connected graph. If G is a complete
multipartite graph having t parts and the number of secrets is |S|=2r>t, for some
positive integer r, then there exists a secret sharing scheme 7 in which the dealer's
randomness is equal to +(G, US , 7)=log |S|; otherwise +(G, |S| )2 log |S|.
Proof. From Corollary 2.12 we get +(G, |S| )log |S|. Therefore, +(G, US , 7)
log |S| for any scheme 7. Suppose G be a multipartite graph with parts V1 , ..., Vt .
The following secret sharing scheme 7 from [15] has dealer’s randomness equal to
log |S|. Let S=GF(2r) with 2r>t and x1 , ..., xt be distinct elements of GF(2r)
known to all participants. If the secret s is chosen in S, then the dealer randomly
chooses an element : # GF(q) and gives the share sxi+: to all participants in Vi ,
for each i=1, ..., t. It is obvious that this realizes a secret sharing scheme 7 with
dealer’s randomness equal to log |S|.
Now we prove that if G is not a complete multipartite graph then +(G)
2 log |S|. From Theorem 4.2 of [10] we have that any connected graph that is
not a complete multipartite graph must contain four vertices w, x, y, z such that
the induced subgraph G[w, x, y, z] is isomorphic to either G1 or G2 , where
V(G1)=V(G2)=[P1 , P2 , P3 , P4], E(G1)=[P1 P2 , P2 P3 , P3P4], and E(G2)=
[P1P2 , P2 P3 , P3P4 , P2P4]. It is easy to see that P1P3 is an independent sequence
for both G1 and G2 , and thus, from Theorem 2.11, we get +(G, |S| )2 log |S|. K
2.4. An NP-Hardness Result
Theorem 2.11 tells us that if an access structure A contains an independent
sequence of length m and the secret is chosen in S, then the dealer’s randomness
satisfies +(A)m log |S|. In the previous section we have seen that this bound is
tight for some classes of access structures. Other classes for which this bound is
tight are given in Section 2.5. However, computing the length of the longest inde-
pendent sequence is a hard computational problem, even in the simpler case in
which the access structure is the closure of the edge-set of a graph. Actually, we can
prove the stronger result that even computing an approximation to it is difficult.
We say that an approximation algorithm for an optimization problem has a ratio
bound of \(n) if for any input of size n, the cost C of the solution produced by the
approximation algorithm is within a factor of \(n) of the cost C* of an optimal
solution; that is,
max \ CC* ,
C*
C +\(n).
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Define the longest-independent sequence problem as follows: Given a graph
G=(V(G), E(G)), determine the length m*(G) of the longest independent sequence
in A=cl(E(G)).
Recall that an independent set of a graph G=(V(G), E(G)) is a set IV(G) such
that no two vertices in I are joined by an edge in E(G). The independence number
or stability number :(G) is defined to be the maximum cardinality of an independ-
ent set of G. The following technical lemma holds.
Lemma 2.15. Given a connected graph G=(V(G), E(G)) with at least one edge,
it is possible to construct in polynomial time a graph G$=(V(G$), E(G$)) such that
m*(G$)=:(G)+1.
Proof. The graph G$ is constructed as follows. The set of vertices V(G$) is equal
to V(G$)=V(G) _ W, where W=[au | u # V(G)] _ [z]. The edge-set E(G$) is
equal to E(G$)=E(G) _ [(u, au) | u # V(G)] _ [(au , av) | u, v # V(G) and u{v] _
[(au , z) | u # V(G)]. It is clear that this construction can be accomplished in polyno-
mial time.
First, we prove that m*(G$):(G)+1. Suppose that the set A=[v1 , ..., vm] is a
maximal independent set of G. Then, v1 , ..., vm , z is an independent sequence for
A=cl(E(G$)). In fact, A _ [z]  A and, for all im, the set Xi=[avi] satisfies
[v1 , ..., vi&1] _ Xi  A and [v1 , ..., vi&1] _ Xi _ [vi] # A. Thus, by Definition 2.10,
v1 } } } vm , z is an independent sequence for A. Hence, m*(G$):(G)+1.
Now, we prove that m*(G$):(G)+1. At most one vertex from W and at most
:(G) vertices from V(G) can belong to any independent sequence for A. Thus,
m*(G$):(G)+1 and the lemma holds. K
Hence, to approximate longest-independent-sequence of a graph G is as hard
as approximating max-independent-set of G. Therefore, all results on the hardness
of approximating max-independent-set (see, e.g., [1, 3, 20, 24]) also apply to
longest-independent-sequence. For instance, the recent result by Ha# stad [24]
implies the nonapproximability of longest-independent-sequence within a factor
of n1&=.
2.5. Upper Bounds
In this section we prove constructive upper bounds on the dealer’s randomness
for general access structures. We make use of the technique introduced by Stinson
[38] based on the concept of decomposition construction, which is a generaliza-
tion of the technique of complete multipartite covering of [10]. We reformulate
Stinson’s construction in terms of the information dispersal algorithm (IDA) intro-
duced by Rabin [33, 34]. A brief description of IDA is given in Appendix B. Stinson
in [38] used this technique to obtain lower bounds on the information rate, which
is the ratio between the size of the secret and the size of the largest share given to
participants of secret sharing schemes, whereas we will use the IDA based construc-
tion to get upper bounds on the dealer’s randomness for general access structures.
Definition 2.16. Let A be an access structure and let A1 , ..., Aa be access struc-
tures such that AiA, for i=1, 2, ..., a. If each qualified set A # A belongs to at
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least b of the access structures A1 , ..., Aa , then the set [A1 , ..., Aa] is called an
(a, b)-decomposition of A.
Given an access structure A and an (a, b)-decomposition of A, it is possible to
realize a secret sharing scheme for the access structure A. Let +i=+(Ai , USi , 7i) be
the amount of andomness required by the dealer to set up the scheme for the access
structure Ai using the scheme 7i and when the secret is uniformly chosen in Si ,
where |Si |=qr>n for some positive integers q and r. The following algorithm
illustrates the steps that the dealer has to execute to share the secret.
Dealer-Algorithm.
1. Let [A1 , ..., Aa] be an (a, b)-decomposition of A.
2. Let s be a secret uniformly chosen in S with |S|=qN, where N=rb and q
and r are positive integers.
3. Using the IDA, encode s in a pieces _1 } } } _a , in such a way that any b
pieces can reconstruct s.
4. Using the secret sharing scheme 7i , share each _i in the access structure
Ai , for i=1, ..., a.
It is easy to see that in the previous algorithm each piece _i , for i=1, ..., a, is
r log q bits of information. Since each qualified set in A belongs to at least b access
structures of the (a, b)-decomposition, each set of participants X # A can
reconstruct the whole s. If X  A, then X does not belong to any of the access struc-
tures of the (a, b)-decomposition, hence the participants in X have no information
on the _i’s, for i=1, ..., a, which means that they have no information on s. There-
fore, the previous algorithm realizes a secret sharing scheme for an access structure
A given an (a, b)-decomposition of it. The following theorem holds.
Theorem 2.17. Let A be an access structure and let [A1 , ..., Aa] be an (a, b)-
decomposition of A. For i=1, ..., a, let 7i be a secret sharing scheme for Ai with
secret uniformly chosen in Si , where |Si |=qr, for some integers q and r. If the secret
for A is uniformly chosen in S, where |S|=qrb, then there exists a secret sharing
scheme 7 for A such that the dealer's randomness +(A, qrb) satisfies
+(A, qrb)+(A, US , 7)= :
a
i=1
+i ,
where +i=+(Ai , USi , 7i) is the dealer's randomness of the scheme 7i for Ai when the
secret is uniformly chosen in Si .
Proof. From the previous discussion it is clear that the Dealer-Algorithm
realizes a secret sharing scheme 7 of a uniformly chosen secret s # Sm with |S|=qN
and N=rb for the access structure A. It is easy to see that the Dealer-Algorithm
needs randomness H(P1 } } } Pn | S)=ai=1 +i to share the secret s. Thus, the dealer’s
randomness +(A, qrb) satisfies +(A, qrb)+(A, US , 7)=ai=1 +i . K
The following results are consequences of Theorem 2.17.
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Corollary 2.18. Let G be a graph. If ’(G) is the smallest number of complete
multipartite subgraphs needed to cover all edges of G and the number of secrets is
|S|=2r, for some positive integer r, then there exists a secret sharing scheme 7 in
which the dealer's randomness satisfies +(G, |S| )+(G, US , 7)=’(G) log |S|.
Proof. Let G1 , G2 , ..., G’(G) be the complete multipartite subgraphs needed to
cover all edges of G. It is easy to see that these subgraphs form an (’(G), 1)-decom-
position of the access structure consisting of the closure of the edge-set of G.
Since +(Gi , US , 7i)=log |S|, for i=1, 2, ..., ’(G) (Theorem 2.14 implies that such
a scheme 7i exists), by Theorem 2.17 we obtain +(G, |S| )+(G, US , 7)=
’(G)i=1 +(Gi , US , 7i)=’(G) log |S|. K
The following result gives an upper bound on the dealer’s randomness in terms
of the number of vertices of the graph and of the size of a minimum vertex cover
of it.
Corollary 2.19. Let G be a graph on n vertices. If the number of secrets is
|S|=22r, for some positive integer r, then there exists a secret sharing scheme 7 in
which the dealer's randomness satisfies
+(G, |S| )+(G, US , 7)=min {n2 , v(G)= log |S|,
where v(G) is the size of a minimum vertex cover of G.
Proof. For each vertex x # V(G), let Gx be the graph with vertex-set V(Gx)=
[x] _ [ y | xy # E(G)] and edge-set E(Gx)=[xy | xy # E(G)]. The graph Gx is called
the star graph with center x. Clearly these subgraphs form an (n, 2)-decomposition
of the access structure that is the closure of the edge-set of G. Theorem 2.14 implies
that there exists a scheme 7x with secrets chosen in S$, where |S$|=2r, such that
+(Gx , US$ , 7x)=log |S$|. Therefore, from Theorem 2.17 we obtain that there exists
a scheme 7 such that +(G, |S| )+(G, US , 7)=nr=(n log |S| )2.
Let v(G) be the size of a minimum vertex cover of the graph G. It is trivial to see
that ’(G)v(G) and, therefore, from Corollary 2.18 we get +(G, |S| )
v(G) log |S|. K
If the graph Cn is a cycle on n vertices then we have the following result.
Corollary 2.20. Let Cn be the cycle on n vertices. Suppose that the number of
secrets is |S|=22r, for some positive integer r. Then there exists an optimal secret
sharing scheme 7, with respect to the number of random bits used, in which the
dealer's randomness is equal to +(Cn , US , 7)=log |S| if n=3, 4; otherwise
(Wn2X&1) log |S|+(Cn , |S| )(n2) log |S|, if n5.
Proof. If n=3, 4 then Cn is a complete multipartite graph. Thus, from
Theorem 2.14, we have that there exists an optimal secret sharing 7 in which the
dealer’s randomness is equal to +(Cn , US , 7)=log |S|. If n5, let P1 , P2 , ..., Pn be
the n participants in clockwise order. The upper bound is given by Corollary 2.19.
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The lower bound follows from Theorem 2.11 by observing that the sequence of
Wn2X&1 participants P1P3 } } } P2Wn2X&3 is independent. K
2.6. Trees
In this section we consider access structures based on trees, that is, access struc-
tures that are the closure of the edge-set of an acyclic graph.
Let G be a tree. From Corollary 2.19 we have +(G, |S | )v(G ) log |S |. In the
following we will prove that +(G, |S | )v(G ) log |S | by computing an independent
sequence of length v(G ) in G.
Let deg-one(G) be the set of all vertices of G of degree one; that is,
deg-one(G )=[u # V(G) | deg(u)=1].
Definition 2.21. The label of a vertex of the graph G is defined as
1. The label of a leaf (i.e., a vertex of degree one) is 0.
2. The label of an internal vertex x is equal to 1+the label of x in the
graph G$, where V(G$)=V(G)-deg-one(G ) and E(G$)=E(G )&[uv | deg(u)=1 or
deg(v)=1].
A well-known algorithm for finding a minimum vertex cover VC of a given tree
G is the following:
Covering-Algorithm.
VC=<
while |V(G )|>2 do
Let u # V(G ) be a vertex with label 1
VC=VC _ [u]
V(G)=V(G )&[[u] _ [v | uv # E(G ), deg(v)=1]]
E(G)=E(G )&[uv | uv # E(G )]
if E(G)=[xy] then VC=VC _ [x]
An algorithm to compute an independent sequence P1 } } } Pq , where q=v(G ), is the
following:
i=0
while |V(G )|>2 do
choose a vertex u # V(G ) with label 1
let u$ be a leaf such that uu$ # E(G )
i=i+1; Pi=u$ ; Xi=u
V(G)=V(G )&[[u] _ [v | uv # E(G ), deg(v)=1]]
E(G)=E(G )&[uv | uv # E(G )]
if E(G)=[xy] then i=i+1; Pi=x; Xi=y
q=i
From the previous algorithm it is easy to see that the sequence of participants
P1 } } } Pq is independent. Moreover, it is easy to see that q=v(G ). From Theorem 2.11
it follows that +(G, |S | )v(G) log |S |. Thus, the next theorem holds.
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Theorem 2.22. Let G be a tree with minimum vertex cover of size v(G). If the num-
ber of secrets is |S |=2r, for some positive integer r, then there exists a secret sharing
scheme in which the dealer’s randomness +(G, US , 7 ) is equal to +(G, US , 7 )=
v(G ) log |S |.
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of the previous theorem.
Corollary 2.23. Let G be a path on n vertices. If the number of secrets is
|S |=2r, for some positive integer r, then there exists a secret sharing scheme in which
the dealer’s randomness +(G, , US , 7 ) is equal to +(G, US , 7 )=wn2x log |S |.
2.7. Randomness in (c, t, n) Ramp Schemes
Any access structure A # 2P gives a partition of the family of sets 2P ; i.e., the
family 2P is partitioned into the family of qualified sets and the family of non-
qualified sets. In many situations the family of sets that are required to reconstruct
the secret do not constitute a partition of 2P. Secret sharing shemes of this kind
have been studied in [7, 13, 21, 31].
Such schemes are useful in distributed protocols for secure computation in the
fault-tolerance model. Franklin and Yung [21] considered such secret sharing
schemes as the building blocks of a general compilation technique for parallelizing
secure protocols. They introduced (c, t, k, n)-multi-secret sharing schemes, which
are secret sharing schemes that distribute k secrets to n participant in such a way
that: (1) any subset of at least t participants can recover all k secrets; (2) any subset
of at most c participant can deduce nothing about the k secrets. Franklin and Yung
gave a construction of a (c, t, k, n)-multi-secret scheme, with c=t&k, by generaliz-
ing Shamir’s scheme [35]. Their construction is the following. Let s1 , ..., sk be k
secrets each belonging to GF(q), where q>n+k is a prime number. Assume that
:1 , ..., :n and e1 , ..., ek are preselected elements of GF(q) that are known to all n
participants. Each participant Pi receives the share f (:i ), where f (x) is a random
polynomial of degree t&1 such that f (ej )=sj , for j=1, 2, ..., k. It is easy to see that
any t participants can interpolate their shares to recover f (x), and hence recover all
k secrets whereas any c=t&k participants have no information on the k secrets.
If we consider all the k secrets as a unique ‘‘super-secret’’ then the (c, t, k, n)-multi-
secret sharing schemes can be easily viewed as (c, t, n) ramp schemes. A (c, t, n)
ramp scheme is a protocol to distribute a secret s among a set P of n participants
in such a way that sets of participants of cardinality greater than or equal to t can
reconstruct the secret s, sets of participants of cardinality greater than c and less
than t might have ‘‘some’’ information on s. Note that if t=c+1 then the (c, t, n)
ramp scheme is a (t, n) threshold scheme. In [13] (c, t, n) ramp schemes were for-
mally defined as follows.
A (c, t, n) ramp scheme, where 1c<tn, is a sharing of the secrets in S among
participants in P, |P|=n, such that
1. Any set of at least t participants can reconstruct the secret.
Formally, for all AP with |A|t, it holds that H(S | A)=0.
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2. Any set of at most c participants has absolutely no information on the
secret.
Formally, for all AP with |A|c, it holds that H(S | A)=H(S ).
Besides [21], another example of (c, t, n) ramp schemes can be found in [31].
To analyze the randomness needed by the dealer we define the dealer’s random-
ness of a (c, t, n) ramp scheme 7, when the probability distribution on the set of
secrets S is 6S , as
+r(c, t, n, 6S , 7 )=H(P1 } } } Pn | S ).
The value +(c, t, n, 6S , 7 ) represents the amount of randomness required by the
dealer to set up the scheme when using the scheme 7 and when 6S is the probabil-
ity distribution on the secret. Since we are interested in the minimum amount
possible of randomness for a (c, t, n) ramp scheme, we give the following definition.
Definition 2.24. For all integers c, t, n such that 1c<tn, the dealer’s ran-
domness +r(c, t, n, q) is defined as
+r(c, t, n, q)= inf
Q, T
+r(c, t, n, 6S , 7),
where Q is the space of all probability distributions 6S on a set S of q secrets and
T is the space of all (c, t, n) ramp schemes 7.
To prove a lower bound on the dealer’s randomness +r(c, t, n) we need the
following three results.
Lemma 2.25. Let P be a set of n participants and let X, Y # 2P. If |X |+|Y |c
then in any (c, t, n) ramp scheme it holds that H(Y | X )=H(Y | XS ).
The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 2.5.
The following lower bound on the size of information held by any group of t&c
participants in a (c, t, n) ramp scheme holds.
Lemma 2.26. In any (c, t, n) ramp scheme and for any different t participants
Pi1 , ..., Pit it holds that
H(Pic+1Pi2 } } } Pi t | Pi 1 Pi 2 } } } Pic )H(S ).
Proof. Let XA , XBP be two disjoint sets of participants of size |XB |c and
|XA |t&|XB |. The mutual information I(XA ; S | XB) can be written either as
H(XA | XB)&H(XA | SXB) or as H(S | XB)&H(S | XAXB). Since H(S | XAXB)=0
and H(S | XB)=H(S ), it follows that
H(XA | XB)=H(S )+H(XA | SXB).
Since |XA |t&c, the theorem holds. K
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In any (c, t, n) ramp scheme we can prove that, for any r<t&c, there exists
at least an r-tuple of participants Pi 1 , ..., Pi r # P such that H(Pi1 } } } Pi r )
rH(S )(t&c). This is formalized by the following lemma.
Lemma 2.27. In any (c, t, n) ramp scheme, for any r<t&c, there exists at least
an r-tuple of participants Pi1 , ..., Pir # P such that H(Pi 1 } } } Pir )[r(t&c)] H(S ).
Proof. Fix a (c, t, n) ramp scheme. The proof is by induction on r. Lemma 2.26
and inequalities (7) and (10) of Appendix A imply that for any t&c participants
Pi1 , Pi 2 , ..., Pit&c there exists a participant Pij , ij # [i1 , i2 , ..., it&c], such that
H(Pij )H(S )(t&c). Therefore the lemma is proved for r=1.
Suppose the lemma true for r. Suppose that participants Pi1 , Pi 2 , ..., Pi r
satisfy the lemma. Let Pi r+1 be participant such that Pir+1  [Pi 1 , Pi2 , ..., Pir]. If
H(Pi1 } } } PirPi r+1 )(r+1) H(S )(t&c) then we are done. If H(Pi 1 } } } Pi r Pir+1)<
(r+1) H(S )(t&c) then from Lemma 2.26 we have that the entropy of any t&c
participants is at least the entropy of the secret. In particular, we have that
H(Pi1 } } } PirPir+1Pir+2 } } } Pit&c )H(S), where [Pir+2 } } } Pit&c ]P"[Pi1 } } } Pir Pir+1].
Hence, from (4) and (7) of Appendix A, and by the inductive hypothesis, we have
H(Pi1 } } } PirPi r+1 )+H(Pir+2 } } } Pit&c | Pi1 } } } PirPi r+1)H(S ). Therefore,
H(Pir+2 } } } Pit&c | Pi 1 } } } Pir Pir+1 )>\1&r+1t&c+ H(S )
=
t&c&(r+1)
t&c
H(S ).
From above inequality and Eq. (10) of Appendix A it follows that there exists an
index ij # [ir+2 , i2 , ..., it&c], such that H(Pij | Pi 1 } } } Pir Pir+1 )>H(S )(t&c). There-
fore, from (4) of Appendix A one gets
H(Pi1 } } } Pir Pi j )=H(Pi1 } } } Pi r )+H(Pij | Pi1 } } } Pir )
>
r
t&c
H(S )+
H(S )
t&c
=
r+1
t&c
H(S ).
Thus, the lemma is proved. K
The next theorem shows that the (c, t, n) ramp scheme given in [21] and out-
lined at the beginning of this section is optimal with respect to the dealer’s random-
ness +r(c, t, n, q).
Theorem 2.28. Let the number of secrets be |S |=2l>n+t&c, for some positive
integer l. The optimal number of random bits to set up a (c, t, n) ramp scheme is equal
to +r(c, t, n, US , 7)=[c(t&c)] log |S |.
Proof. Let c=q(t&c)+r, where 0r<t&c and q # N. Let Pi1 , ..., Pir # P be
r participants satisfying Lemma 2.27 and let Pi r+1 , ..., Pic # P be any other c&r
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participants. With Yi , for i=1, 2, ..., q, we denote the set of participants Yi=
[Pi r+(i+1)(t&c)+1 , ..., Pir+ i (t&c) ]. Moreover, with Xi we denote the set of participants
Xi=[Pi1 , ..., Pic ]"Yi . If c<t&c then q=0, r=c, and there are no sets Xi , Yi . We
get
H(Pi 1 } } } Pic )=H(Pi 1 } } } Pir )+H(Y1 | Pi1 } } } Pi r )+ :
q
i=2
H(Yi | Y1 } } } Yi&1Pi1 } } } Pir )
(from (4) of Appendix A)

r
t&c
H(S )+ :
q
i=1
H(Yi | Xi )
(from Lemma 2.27 and (9) of Appendix A)

r
t&c
H(S )+qH(S )
(from Lemma 2.26)
=
c
t&c
H(S ).
Therefore, H(Pi1 } } } Pic )[c(t&c)] H(S ). Since [Pi1 , ..., Pic ] is not a qualified set
from the obvious generalization of Theorem 2.6 to ramp schemes, we get
H(Pi1 } } } Pic )[c(t&c)] log |S |. From Eqs. (4) and (3) of Appendix A we get
H(P1P2 } } } Pn | S )H(Pi1 } } } Pi c | S ).
Since [Pi 1 , ..., Pic ] is not a qualified set, from Lemma 2.5 we have H(Pi1 } } } Pic )=
H(Pi1 } } } Pic | S ) and thus
H(P1P2 } } } Pn | S )H(Pi 1 } } } Pic | S )
=H(Pi1 } } } Pi c )

c
t&c
log |S |.
Hence, for any (c, t, n) ramp scheme it holds that
H(P1P2 } } } Pn | S )
c
t&c
log |S |.
We have proved a lower bound on the dealer’s randomness +r(c, t, n); that is,
+r(c, t, n)(c log |S | )(t&c). It is easy to see that the matching upper bound
comes from the scheme presented in [21], outlined at the beginning of this section,
when the secrets are uniformly chosen in S, where |S |=2l>n+t&c for some
positive integer l. Thus, theorem is proved. K
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3. DEALER’S RANDOMNESS IN k-SECURE t-CONFERENCE KDSs
Key distribution is a central problem in cryptographic systems, and is a major
component of the security subsystem of distributed systems, communication
systems, and data networks. The increase in bandwidth, size, usage, and applica-
tions of such systems is likely to pose new challenges and to require novel ideas.
A growing application area in networking is ‘‘conferencing’’ where a group of
entities (or network locations) collaborate privately in an interactive procedure
(such as a board meeting, a scientific discussion, a task-force, a classroom, or an
interactive engineering design group). In this section we consider perfectly secure
key distribution for conferences introduced in [9] (note that key distribution for
two-party communicationsession-keysis a special case of conferences of size 2).
We will define and analyze the randomness needed by the dealer to set up a k-
secure t-conference key distribution scheme.
3.1. Key Distribution Schemes
A key distribution scheme for dynamic conferences is a method by which initially
an (off-line) trusted dealer distributes private individual pieces of information to a
set of users. Later, each user member of any group of users of a given size (a
dynamic conference) can compute a common secure group key. In this setting, any
group of t users can compute a common key using only his private initial piece of
information and the identities of the other t&1 group users. Keys are secure against
coalitions of up to k users; that is, even if k users pool together their pieces they
cannot compute anything about a key of any t-size conference composed of other
users. A k-secure t-conference key distribution scheme for n users has been intro-
duced in [9]. Now, we briefly review the formal setting for this notion.
Let U=[User1 , ..., Usern] be a set of users. The distribution scheme, that is, the
algorithm used by the dealer to generate the pieces of information that will be dis-
tributed to the users, is randomized. The dealer generates n pieces u1 , u2 , ..., un . The
piece ui denotes the information given by the dealer to user Useri . Let Ui be the set
of all possible pieces given to user Useri . Given a set X=[i1 , i2 , ..., ir], where
i1<i2< } } } <ir , of elements in [1, 2, ..., n], denote by UX the set Ui1_ } } } _Uir .
The dealer’s algorithm defines a probability distribution on U1_ } } } _Un that, in
turn, naturally induces a probability distribution [ pUX (u)]u # UX on UX , for any set
X # 2[n], where 2[n] is the family of all sets of elements in [1, 2, ..., n]; i.e.,
2[n]=2[1, 2, ..., n]. Let H(UX )=H(Ui1 } } } Ui r ) be the entropy of the probability distri-
bution [ pUX (u)]u # UX on UX=Ui1_ } } } _Ui r . Given a set X=[i1 , i2 , ..., it] # 2
[n],
each user Useri j can deterministically compute, on input only uij and i1 , ..., ij&1 ,
ij+1 , ..., it , his common key sX to be used with users User i1 , ..., Useri j&1 , Useri j+1 , ...,
Useri t . We denote by SX the set of all possible values of the common key sX . For
any X # 2[n] with |X |=t, the probability distribution on U1_ } } } _Un naturally
induces a probability distribution on SX , since each user Useri j deterministically
computes the conference key sX from the information uij received by the dealer. Let
[ pS X (s)]s # SX , where X=[i1 , i2 , ..., it] # 2
[n], be the a priori probability that the
common key among users Useri 1 , ..., Useri t is s # SX , and let H(SX ) be its entropy.
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The maximum value that the security parameter k can take in any t-conference
KDS for n users is n&t, since any adversary coalition can contain at most n&t
users. Formally, we define a k-secure t-conference key distribution scheme for n
users as follows.
Definition 3.1. Let U be a set of n users and let t and k be nonnegative
integers with k+tn. A noninteractive k-secure t-conference key distribution
scheme for U is a scheme such that
1. Each group of t users can noninteractively compute the common key.
Formally, for all X # 2[n] with |X |=t, for all uX # UX with pU X (uX )>0,
a unique secret-key sX exists such that for each user Useri , i # X, it holds
that p(sX | ui )=1.
2. Any group of k users have no information on any key they should not
know.
Formally, for all Y, X # 2[n], with |Y |=k, |X |=t, and X & Y=<, for
all uX # UX and uY # UY , with pU Y (uY )>0, and for all sX # SX , it holds
that p(sX | uY )=pS X (sX).
Property 1 means that given the value held by the user Useri l , l=1, 2, ..., t, and
the identity of the other t&1 users, a unique value of the common key exists.
Property 2 states that the probability that the common key among users
Useri1 , ..., Useri t is sX , where X=[i1 , ..., it], given the information held by users
Userj1 , ..., Userj k , where Y=[ j1 , ..., jk], and X & Y=<, is equal to the a priori
probability that the common key is sX . This means that the random variables SX
and UY are statistically independent and, thus, the values uj1 , ..., ujk reveal no infor-
mation on the common key sX .
By using the entropy function it is possible to give an equivalent definition of a
noninteractive k-secure t-conference KDS.
Definition 3.2. Let U be a set of n users and let t and k be nonnegative
integers with k+tn. A noninteractive k-secure t-conference key distribution
scheme for U is a scheme such that
1$. Each t users can noninteractively compute the common key.
Formally, for all X # 2[n] with |X |=t, and for each User i , i # X, it holds
that H(SX | Ui )=0.
2$. Any group of k users have no information on any key they should not
know.
Formally, for all Y, X # 2[n], with |Y |=k, |X |=t, and X & Y=<, it
holds that H(SX | UY )=H(SX ).
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Notice that H(SX | Ui )=0 for each Useri , i # X, means that each set of values
held by the user Useri corresponds to a unique value of the common key. In fact,
by definition, H(SX | Ui )=0 is equivalent to the fact that for all ui # Ui , with
pU i (ui )>0, a unique value sX # SX exists such that p(sX | ui )=1. Moreover,
H(SX | UY )=H(SX ) is equivalent to saying that SX and UY are statistically inde-
pendent; i.e., for all uY # UY , with pU Y (uY )>0, we have p(sX | uY )=p(sX ).
It is easy to see that any noninteractive k-secure t-conference KDS is also
k$-secure for all nonnegative integers k$<k (see, e.g., [9]).
Definition 3.2 does not say anything about the entropies of random variables SX
and SX $ , for different X, X$ # 2[n], with |X |=|X$|=t. For example, we could have
either H(SX )>H(SX $) or H(SX )H(SX $). Our results apply to the general case of
arbitrary entropies on keys, but for clarity we state our results for the simpler case
that all entropies on keys are equal, i.e., H(SX )=H(SX $). We denote this common
entropy by H(S ).
3.2. Dealer’s Randomness in KDSs
In this section we define the randomness needed by the dealer to set up a
k-secure t-conference key distribution scheme.
Analogously to Section 2, to analyze the randomness needed by the dealer we
define the dealer’s randomness of a k-secure t-conference key distribution scheme 2,
when the entropy on the secret key is H(S ), as
#(k, t, n, H(S ), 2)=H(U1 } } } Un).
The value #(k, t, n, H(S ), 2) represents the amount of randomness required by the
dealer to set up the scheme when using the scheme 2 and when H(S ) is the entropy
of the secret key. Since we are interested in the minimum amount possible of
randomness for a given size of conference t, security parameter k, number of
participants n, and entropy H on the set of the secret keys, we give the following
definition.
Definition 3.3. Let U=[User1 , ..., Usern] be a set of users. The dealer’s ran-
domness #(k, t, n, H ) of a k-secure t-conference key distribution scheme for U is
defined as
#(k, t, n, H )= inf
T, Q
#(k, t, n, H, 2),
where T is the space of all k-secure t-conference key distribution schemes for U
and Q is the space of all probability distributions on common keys with entropy H.
3.3. Lower Bound
In this section we prove a lower bound on the dealer’s randomness of any dis-
tribution protocol that realizes a k-secure t-conference key distribution scheme. We
first recall a lemma proved in [9].
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Lemma 3.4 [9]. Let U be a set of n users and let r, k, and t be non-negative
integers with k+tn. Let X, Y1 , ..., Yr , Z be subsets of [1, 2, ..., n] such that
|Z|=k, Z & X=<, Z & Yi{<, and |X |=|Yi |=t, for i=1, ..., r. Then, in any non-
interactive k-secure t-conference key distribution scheme for U, it holds that
H(SX | SY1 } } } SY r )=H(SX ).
The next theorem states a lower bound on the amount of information held by a
user Userj+1 given the information known by users User1 , ..., Userj .
Lemma 3.5. Let U be a set of n users and let k and t be non-negative integers with
k+tn. In any noninteractive k-secure t-conference key distribution scheme, the
entropy H(Uj+1 | U1 } } } Uj ), for 0 j k, satisfies
H(Uj+1 | U1 } } } Uj )\k+t&1&jt&1 + H(S ).
Proof. Consider the set of indices I=[1, 2, ..., j, j+2, ..., k+t]. Let m=
( k+t&1&jt&1 )&1. Construct A, B1 , ..., Bm , C as follows. Set C is equal to C=[1, ..., j,
j+2, ..., k+1], set A is equal to A=[ j+1, k+2, ..., k+t], and, finally, set Bl , for
l=1, ..., m, is constructed taking the element j+1 along with any t&1 elements
from the set I"[1, ..., j ]; that is,
Bl # [( j+1, x1 , ..., xt&1] | x1 , ..., xt&1 # I"[1, ..., j ]].
From (4) and (3) of Appendix A one gets H(SB1 } } } SB mSA | U1 } } } Uj+1)
ml=1 H(SB l | Uj+1)+H(SA | Uj+1). Since j+1 # Bl , for l=1, ..., m, and j+1 # A,
from 1$ of Definition 3.2 it follows that
H(SB1 } } } SB m SA | U1 } } } Uj+1)=0.
Therefore, from (8) of Appendix A one has
I(SB 1 } } } SB m SA ; Uj+1 | U1 } } } Uj )=H(SB 1 } } } SB mSA | U1 } } } Uj ). (1)
Hence,
H(Uj+1 | U1 } } } Uj )=I(SB1 } } } SBm SA ; Uj+1 | U1 } } } Uj )
+H(Uj+1 | SB1 } } } SBmSAU1 } } } Uj )
(from (5) and (6) of Appendix A)
=H(SB1 } } } SBmSA | U1 } } } Uj )+H(Uj+1 | SB1 } } } SBm SAU1 } } } Uj )
(from (1))
H(SB1 } } } SBmSA | U1 } } } Uj ) (from (3) of Appendix A)
=H(SB1 | U1 } } } Uj )+ } } } +H(SBm | SB1 } } } SBm&1U1 } } } Uj )
+H(SA | SB1 } } } SBmU1 } } } Uj ) (from (4) of Appendix A).
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Sets Z=C, X=A, and Yi=Bi for i=1, ..., m satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 3.4.
Thus we have H(SA | SB 1 } } } SB m U1 } } } Uj )=H(SA | U1 } } } Uj ). Moreover, for each
h, 1hm, sets X=Bh , Z=I"Bh , and Yi=Bi , for i=1, ..., h&1, satisfy the
hypothesis of Lemma 3.4. Thus, H(SB h | SB 1 } } } SB h&1 U1 } } } Uj )=H(SB h | U1 } } } Uj )
and
H(Uj+1 | U1 } } } Uj ) :
m
l=1
H(SB l | U1 } } } Uj )+H(SA | U1 } } } Uj ).
Since [1, 2, ..., j ] & Bl=<, for l=1, ..., m, and [1, 2, ..., j ] & A=<, from 2$ of Defi-
nition 3.2 we have H(SBl | U1 } } } Uj )=H(SB l ), for l=1, ..., m, and H(SA | U1 } } } Uj )
=H(SA). Thus one finds
H(Uj+1 | U1 } } } Uj )\k+t&1&jt&1 + H(S ).
Hence the theorem is proved. K
The next theorem provides a lower bound on the dealer’s randomness of any dis-
tribution protocol realizing a k-secure t-conference key distribution scheme for a set
of n users.
Theorem 3.6. Let U be a set of n users and let k and t be nonnegative integers
with k+tn. In any noninteractive k-secure t-conference key distribution scheme the
dealer’s randomness #(k, t, n) satisfies
#(k, t, n, H )\k+tt + H(S ).
Proof. The total randomness H(U1 } } } Un) in a KDS can be lower bounded as
follows:
H(U1 } } } Un)=H(U1)+ :
n
j=2
H(Uj | U1 } } } Uj&1)
(from (4) of Appendix A)
H(U1)+ :
k
j=1
H(Uj+1 | U1 } } } Uj )
(from (3) of Appendix A)
\k+t&1t&1 + H(S )+ :
k
j=1 \
k+t&1&j
t&1 + H(S )
(from Lemma 3.5).
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Since, for positive integers m and h, we have
:
h
l=0 \
l
m+=\
h+1
m+1+
(see for example Knuth [27, p. 55]), it follows that
H(U1 } } } Un)\k+tt + H(S ).
Thus, the theorem is proved. K
A protocol to realize a k-secure t-conference key distribution scheme has recently
been presented [9]. In this protocol the dealer generates a symmetric polynomial
f (x1 , ..., xt) of degree k in t variables with coefficients over GF(2r), where 2r>n,
for some positive integer r. To each user Useri the dealer gives the polynomial
fi (x2 , ..., xt)=f (i, x2 , ..., xt), that is, the polynomial obtained by evaluating
f (x1 , ..., xt) at x1=i. If users User j1 , ..., Userj t want to set up a conference key then
each user Userj i evaluates fj i (x2 , ..., xt) at (x2 , ..., xt)=( j1 , ..., ji&1 , ji+1 , ..., jt ). The
conference key is equal to sj1 , ..., j t=f ( j1 , ..., jt).
In a symmetric polynomial f (x1 , ..., xt) the coefficient ai1 , ..., i t is equal to
a_(i1 ), ..., _(i t) , for all permutations _: [i1 , i2 , ..., it]  [i1 , i2 , ..., it]. Thus, the number
of coefficients of a symmetric polynomial in t variables of degree k is equal to the
number of possible ways of choosing with repetitions t elements (corresponding to
indices i1 , ..., it) from a set of k+1 elements (each ij can assume k+1 values). This
is equal to ( k+tt ). Hence, if the common keys are uniformly chosen in GF(2
r), with
2r>k, for some positive integer r, then the dealer randomness in the KDS is equal
to ( k+tt ) r. Therefore, the bound given in Theorem 3.6 is tight.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we gave a systematic analysis of the amount of randomness needed
by secret sharing schemes and secure key distribution schemes. We presented both
upper and lower bounds on the number of random bits needed by secret sharing
schemes. The bounds are tight for several classes of secret sharing schemes. For
secure key distribution schemes we have provided a lower bound on the amount of
randomness needed, thus showing the optimality of a recently proposed key dis-
tribution protocol.
Our approach can be extended to analyze the dependencies between randomness,
security, and probability of cheating in the model of Tompa and Woll [39]. Using
the results in [18] and the techniques of the present paper one can provide a lower
bound on the randomness in secret sharing schemes secure against coalition of
dishonest players.
Recently, following the approach presented in this paper, have been proposed
additional results on randomness in secret sharing schemes [14].
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APPENDIX A
Information Theory Background
In this appendix we review the basic concepts of information theory used in our
definitions and proofs. For a complete treatment of the subject the reader is advised
to consult [19].
Given a probability distribution [ p(x)]x # X on a set X, we define the entropy of
X, H(X ), as
H(X )=& :
x # X
p(x) log p(x).3
The entropy enjoys the property
0H(X )log |X |, (2)
where H(X )=0 if and only if there exists x0 # X such that p(x0)=1; H(X )=log |X |
if and only if p(x)=1|X | , for all x # X.
Given two sets X and Y and a joint probability distribution [ p(x, y )]x # X, y # Y on
their cartesian product, the conditional entropy H(X | Y ), is defined as
H(X | Y )=& :
y # Y
:
x # X
p( y ) p(x | y) log p(x | y).
From the definition of conditional entropy it is easy to see that
H(X | Y )0. (3)
If we have n+1 sets X1 , ..., Xn , Y, the entropy of X1 } } } Xn given Y can be expressed
as
H(X1 } } } Xn | Y )=H(X1 | Y )+H(X2 | X1Y )+ } } } +H(Xn | X1 } } } Xn&1Y ). (4)
The mutual information I(X ; Y ) between X and Y is defined by
I(X ; Y)=H(X )&H(X | Y )=H(Y)&H(Y | X) (5)
and enjoys the properties
I(X ; Y )=I(Y ; X ) (6)
and
I(X ; Y )0,
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for which one gets
H(X )H(X | Y ). (7)
Given n+2 sets X, Y, Z1 , ..., Zn and a joint probability distribution on their
Cartesian product, the conditional mutual information I(X ; Y | Z1 , ..., Zn) between X
and Y given Z1 , ..., Zn can be written as
I(X; Y | Z1 , ..., Zn)=H(X | Z1 , ..., Zn)&H(X | Z1 , ..., Zn Y)
=H(Y | Z1 , ..., Zn)&H(Y | Z1 , ..., Zn X). (8)
Since the conditional mutual information is always nonnegative we get
H(X | Z1 , ..., Zn)H(X | Z1 , ..., Zn Y). (9)
From (4) and (9) one easily gets that for any sets Y, X1 , ..., Xn and a joint prob-
ability distribution on their Cartesian product it holds that
:
n
i=1
H(Xi | Y)H(X1 X2 } } } Xn | Y). (10)
APPENDIX B
The Information Dispersal Algorithm
In this appendix we review the information dispersal algorithm introduced by
Rabin [33]. Let F=b1b2 } } } bN be a file. We can assume that each bi belongs to the
finite field GF( p), where p is prime. For instance, if the bi’s are eight-bit bytes, then
each bi is less than or equal to 255 and we consider bi # GF(257), i=1, ..., N. We
want to encode the file F into ‘‘small’’ pieces Fi in such a way that we can recover
F knowing only ‘‘some’’ Fi’s. Rabin’s information dispersal algorithm (IDA)
proceeds as follows. Let m be a positive integer and suppose, for the sake of
simplicity, that N=mr for some positive integer r. The file F is first segmented into
pieces of length m:
F=(b1 } } } bm)(bm+1 } } } b2m) } } } (b(r&1) m+1 } } } brm).
Let n=m+k, where k is the number pieces whose loss will not affect the
reconstruction of F. Moreover, let A be a (n_m) matrix with entries in GF( p) such
that every subset of m rows forms a nonsingular matrix (such a matrix can be easily
found, see [34]). Denote by B the (n_r) matrix obtained as follows:
A } \
b1
b2
b
bm
bm+1
bm+2
b
b2m
} } }
} } }
. . .
} } }
b(r&1) m+1
b (r&1) m+2
b
brm +=B=\
F1
F2
b
Fn+ .
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The n pieces F1 , ..., Fn are stored. Now, suppose that only m of them, say
F1 , F2 , ..., Fm , are given. Denote by Am the m_m matrix obtained by considering
the first m rows of A only. The reconstruction of the file F can be easily performed,
as the following relation shows
\
b1
b2
b
bm
bm+1
bm+2
b
b2m
} } }
} } }
. . .
} } }
b(r&1) m+1
b(r&1) m+2
b
brm +=(Am)&1 } \
F1
F2
b
Fm+ .
It is easily seen that the encoding of F into the n pieces F1 , ..., Fn requires O(nmr)
operations in GF( p), while the reconstruction of F from the surviving m pieces
F1 , ..., Fm requires O(m2r) operations in GF( p). Therefore, the encoding and
recovering algorithms are computationally efficient. The number k of losses the
recovering algorithm can tolerate is equal to n&m, and it can be shown that this
is optimal. A fast Fourier transform based IDA requiring fewer operations in GF( p)
has been given by Preparata in [32].
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